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ABSTRACT
This article outlines how a materialist understanding of foreign 
policy predicated on contrasting sovereignty regimes might 
be applied to current conflicts between China and the United 
States and its allies in the South China Sea. A stark divergence 
between liberal and realist commentary, policy prescriptions, 
and policy practices has emerged in both China and the 
United States. We provide a critical overview of the dispute 
before arguing that these disparities are, at root, symptoms 
of a material contradiction between the benefits and risks 
of economic interdependence and territorial expansionism. 
These symptoms are consequently founded upon a real-
world paradox, refracted through fundamentally different 
modalities of practicing state sovereignty, and will ultimately 
be resolved politically. An intensification of interstate rivalry 
is fast becoming the outcome of a period of unprecedented 
economic interconnectedness, to which these variegated 
sovereignty regimes are contributing.
Introduction
On 12 July 2016, an arbitral tribunal at the Permanent Court of Arbitration, 
convened under Annex VII of the United Nations Convention of the Law of the 
Sea, delivered a shock decision: a legally binding judgment invalidating China’s 
claimed “historical rights” over the bulk of the South China Sea (SCS). The SCS 
was confirmed to be largely international waters – open to the right of the U.S. 
Navy (and other actors) to carry out military patrols and surveillance flights. This 
decision also guarantees the legal rights of smaller regional U.S. allies such as 
the Philippines and Vietnam to exploit the hydrocarbon and fish stocks located 
around their seaboards.
This article takes stock of recent geopolitical developments in the SCS as a means 
of reflecting upon Sino-US relations under the conceptual rubric of differentiated 
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“sovereignty regimes” (Agnew 2009). China’s economic expansion has increased 
the capacity and desire of the Chinese state to expand its authority in its marine 
backyard. Wishing to maintain its current system of maritime governance and 
broader political authority in the Asia-Pacific, the United States is being steadily 
drawn into dispute with China. The United States engages with China both directly 
as a unilateral actor and indirectly through its dense institutional and military 
linkages with virtually all other littoral states in the region, which share varying 
degrees of concern with the geopolitical impact of China’s rise. Developments in 
the SCS thus appear to have markedly increased the possibility of some kind of 
conflict between China and its neighbors, or even with the United States directly. 
The SCS, meanwhile, forms just one example of many regional flashpoints around 
China’s maritime borders including the East China Sea, the Yellow Sea, and – further 
afield – the Indian Ocean, all of which have seen intensifications of geopolitical 
rivalries with U.S.-aligned states over the past decade.
Such a potentially dangerous resurgence of conflict between states represent-
ing the two largest capitalist economies – at a time of global economic and political 
turbulence – warrants the sustained attention of critical theorists. Most commenta-
tors (in both the United States and China) are, however, presently producing what 
Robert Cox (1981) might term “problem-solving” theory; advice to state managers 
on how best to deal with “particular sources of trouble” rather than critical theory 
concerned with framing issues in their broader political economic context (128).1 
In the English-speaking world, the result is a reproduction of analysis of liberal and 
realist tropes on Great Power conflicts. In China, similarly, such a schism between 
expansionary and conciliatory analysis and prescription has also emerged.
To explore the genesis and implications of such bipolarity, this article takes 
an in-depth look at territorial contestation in the SCS. We begin by surveying the 
major facts of the dispute. Next, we outline how these contrasting perspectives – in 
both academic and policy-making circles in China and the West – have informed 
both commentary and policy. We root this in a real-world contradiction between 
the benefits of economic integration and the continuing salience of territoriality for 
nation states, especially under fast-changing technological conditions of territorial 
practices (explored below) (Bunnell et al. 2012; Grydehøj 2015).
finally, we demonstrate the explanatory value of a “sovereignty regimes” per-
spective, prior to a focus on geopolitical strategies and engagements – and thus 
to typical liberal and realist framings of the conflict. The concept of sovereignty 
regimes aims to capture, most fundamentally, the inadequacy of methodologically 
nationalist conceptions of the territoriality of sovereign power. Without writing off 
states as arguably the primary political agents of contemporary world order, it is 
equally clear that borders are porous, capitalist production relations are global, 
and analysis predicated upon the fiction of “absolute popular sovereignty vested 
in a national/territorial political community rigidly marked off from all others” is 
largely untenable (Agnew 2009, 98). Instead, we insist upon the contextualization 
of particular instantiations of geopolitical competition in the broader framework 
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of contrasting forms of state, class and political fractions, as well as political inter-
dependencies within the global system. This broadened optic calls into question 
the simplicity of problem-solving theories proposed by those liberal and realist 
commentators close to the dispute.
Shifting patterns of Sino-US relations
for two decades after 1989, U.S. global leadership experienced a somewhat unex-
pected revival. Although this period proved unstable, it has now become clear that 
the United States more or less successfully consolidated large parts of the world 
under its dollar hegemony following the collapse of the Soviet Union (Gowan 
2010; Panitch and Gindin 2012), rendering anticipations of the post-cold war mil-
itary multi-polarity premature in the process. The contemporary significance of 
China’s rise is, to a large extent, that it represents the first major power to emerge 
exterior to Washington’s hub and spokes system of global imperial alliances since 
the breakup of the U.S.S.R. This fact has produced a swell of anxiety among realist 
international relations (IR) theorists (e.g. Mearsheimer 2006).
The challenge of the ascendancy of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) comes, 
moreover, at a moment of generalized crisis for U.S. global leadership. While the 
Great Recession reduced the United States’ projected GDP growth by $1 trillion 
by the end of 2012, China’s own GDP doubled from just over $5 trillion to $10.3 
trillion from 2009 to 2014. Whereas prior “contender states” such as Japan and the 
federal German Republic became deeply integrated into the United States’ sphere 
of influence in the postwar decades, attempts to subsume China under the insti-
tutional architecture of the United States’ globalist sovereignty regime have been 
realized highly unevenly (Van der Pijl 2012). Elements of the Chinese state, such 
as the foreign affairs and finance ministries, have become significantly responsive 
to international engagement, but the Communist Party maintains significant geo-
political autonomy – to which the country’s increasing economic weight appears 
to be contributing rather than eroding.
The gravity with which the United States regards China’s rise is evidenced by 
Obama’s Asian pivot, originally made a month before the outbreak of the Arab 
spring in November 2011. In the intervening period, the Middle East and North 
African (MENA) region has suffered increasingly generalized disorder, while the 
first major challenge to the European Union–NATO axis was led by Putin’s territo-
rial grab in eastern Ukraine in february 2014. Both represent considerable chal-
lenges to U.S. strategy in MENA and East Central Europe – regions long regarded 
as strategic priorities. A laissez-faire approach in both of those cases, however, 
appears to be inversely correlated with a continual build-up of military forces in 
East Asia. Despite complaints regarding the pace of the switch (e.g. Parameswaran 
2016), the pivot has delivered $9 billion in additional funding for the U.S. Pacific 
Command and a 22,000-troop increase in American troops stationed in East Asia (to 
a total of 266,000; Olson 2015), alongside significant progress on the Trans-Pacific 
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Partnership (TPP) designed to purposively exclude China.2 There is little pretense 
now that the prime target of the pivot is not what U.S. interests regard as a dan-
gerously expansionist Middle Kingdom.
In parallel with the US military and multilateral shift has emerged a powerfully 
centralized new Chinese leadership under Xi Jinping, prepared to significantly 
strengthen the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) while projecting military power 
outside of Chinese territory (Economist 2016a). As the global financial system col-
lapsed in 2008 and 2009, the PRC leadership appears to have sensed an opportu-
nity to finally dispense with Deng’s imperative to “hide your strength, bide your 
time,” opting instead for an assertive foreign policy, now deepened under Xi’s 
increasingly centralized reign. While economic and political multi-polarity have 
long been features of the post-Cold War international order, the SCS – referred 
to by Robert Kaplan (2014) as “Asia’s Cauldron,” represents one major arena of 
contemporary world order in which military multi-polarity and great power rivalry 
seem to be re-emerging most strongly.
The SCS and Chinese expansionism
The SCS has for centuries been disputed by both rival regional and colonial powers. 
Rich in fishing stocks and believed to be host to significant quantities of hydro-
carbons, the SCS is now (perhaps most importantly) a critical artery of global 
trade, carrying an estimated $5 trillion of goods annually. Surrounded by newly 
industrialized littoral states that have mostly very recently completed their basic 
processes of “internal” development in terms of political economic stabilization 
and state capacity building, the ocean is fast becoming a space of contestation 
between multiple sovereign claimants, drawing in China, Vietnam, the Philippines, 
Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, and Brunei, as well as, more widely, Japan, South 
Korea, India, and the United States. Although all nine littoral states in the SCS 
have made competing claims to parts of the waters and its features, it is bilateral 
disputes between smaller claimants (especially Vietnam and the Philippines) and 
an expansionary China that forms the most tense contests.
Two major causes lie behind today’s maritime border disputes. The first is 
the coming into effect of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) in 1994, which vastly increased the salience of territorial control over pre-
viously insignificant maritime features. Second is China’s meteoric economic rise, 
alongside a transition toward an increasingly activist foreign policy (Breslin 2010).
UNCLOS, produced in 1982 and ratified by 168 states including China and its 
southeast Asian neighbors (Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, and 
Singapore) though not by the United States, became operative as international 
law in 1994. The law grants states territorial waters of 12 nautical miles and exclu-
sive economic zones (EEZs; granting states unique rights to resource extraction, 
fishing etc.) of 200 miles from the coast of any landmass both permanently above 
water and capable of sustaining human habitation (United Nations 1982). UNCLOS 
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greatly incentivized states to secure their holdings of previously insignificant ter-
ritorial features. As fravel (2014, 542) writes:
Ironically, a regime designed to manage the oceans created new disputes that are simi-
lar to those over territory because they involve areas where competing states can claim 
exclusive rights. UNCLOS increased the value of controlling islands by linking them with 
the ability to claim broader maritime rights.
Western states were the main protagonists of this territorial drive. Six former colo-
nial powers (United States, france, Australia, Russia, the United Kingdom, and 
New Zealand) claimed EEZs totaling 54 million square kilometers under UNCLOS, 
three-quarters of which were based on colonial vestiges separate from their 
home territories (for instance, the British Virgin and Cayman islands, and french 
Polynesia). In contrast, the Chinese claims to EEZs totals under 3 m km2 – less than 
half that of New Zealand’s (Nolan 2013).
Like all international law, UNCLOS remains reliant on national states for its 
enforcement, opening a space for realpolitik in interpretation and practice. This 
leaves weak states vulnerable to organized transgressions of their sovereignty by 
other states claiming to be upholding international law. In December 2008, UN 
Security Council Resolution 1851 granted UN member states the right to tackle 
“vessels, arms and other related equipment used in the commission of piracy and 
armed robbery off the coast of Somalia,” while reaffirming “respect for the sover-
eignty territorial integrity, political independence, and unity of Somalia” (cited in 
Gerstenberger 2013, 358). It is perhaps more than a coincidence of history that 
sustained Chinese maritime expansion began in 2009, so shortly after this prece-
dent was set – and doubly revealing that China itself sent warships to Somalia to 
tackle pirates as its first overseas naval engagement in 600 years (Anderlini 2016). 
China took a lead in violating Somali maritime sovereignty at the very moment it 
began projecting its own.
Jakobson and Medcalf (2015) read China’s claims to the SCS as the outcome of 
two drives. The first, historical, is a desire to overcome China’s “century of [impe-
rialist] humiliation” by asserting control over its once source of weakness in the 
face of Western imperialism – a lack of naval power. Economic dynamism has 
gone hand in hand with expansion of the military, itself a major bastion of political 
power inside the Chinese Communist Party. Mitigating this ambition to exert total 
control over its seaboards is a sharp pragmatism regarding the current military 
balance of forces, in which U.S. hegemony in the Asia-Pacific is likely to remain 
dominant for the forseeable future – as the only large power plausibly capable of 
enforcing global freedom of navigation and protecting the maritime arteries of 
world trade from piracy. Therefore, “China’s realistic strategic maritime objective 
[emphasis added],” they argue, “is to ensure that it is not denied access to its near 
seas and what it perceives as its sovereign maritime rights” (2015).
While it is critical to analyze the specificities of the SCS dispute rather than 
reduce it to one element in a broader Chinese “grand strategy,” a move toward ter-
ritorially expansionist policy by elements of the Chinese state in the SCS does have 
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parallels in other aspects of contemporary Chinese foreign policy. Breslin (2010, 
196) sees “newly assertive Chinese positions” on issues from external violations of 
sovereignty and territorial claims to power equity in international organizations; a 
border dispute with India persists while the opening of China’s first overseas naval 
base in Djibouti was agreed in late 2015. In Southeast Asia alone, the SCS marks 
only one of three significant maritime flashpoints between the United States and 
its allied states and China. In the East China Sea, historic and recently re-inflamed 
Sino-Japanese rivalry has come to a head over the Senkaku/Diayou islands.3 The 
second, less significant dispute, is found in the Yellow Sea between China and 
South Korea.4 Readers should note, then, that although the SCS represents per-
haps the most substantial area of conflict activated by China’s rise, it should be 
understood as part of a wider pattern of regional tensions.
U-shaped line
Chinese claims to the SCS rest upon a map published by the Nationalist Guomindang 
Government in 1948 – the year before its final exile to Taiwan – which showed a 
line, U-shaped, extending over 1400 miles southward from the southern Chinese 
coast and demarcating China’s claimed maritime territory. figure 1 demonstrates 
its scope. Despite falling out of usage during the Mao period, the U-shaped line 
has since been reincarnated as a line consisting of 9, 11, and most recently, 10 
“dashes” (hayton 2014). Its contemporary resurrection began with its inclusion 
on maps submitted to a UN tribunal in 2009 following Malaysian and Vietnamese 
attempts to extend the territorial reach of their coastal shelves. It has since become 
more widely circulated in Chinese public discourse and is now legally mandated to 
be included on all published maps (by state and non-state organizations) as well 
as citizens’ passports. It is China’s U-shaped line that now lies behind conflictual 
sovereignty claims in the SCS.
The intended status of the U-shaped line is entirely ambiguous, more so 
since a tribunal convened under UNCLOS dismissed its legal validity in July 
2016 (see below for more). It remains both legally obtuse (it does not explicitly 
claim the territory as Chinese under any version of international law) and 
cartographically non-contiguous (leaving gaps of several hundred miles where 
territorial claims are unmarked). hayton (2014, 295), drawing on Callahan 
(2009), situates the source of the claim to a U-shaped line in China’s “confused 
transition from empire to republic,” a process by which contemporary policy-
makers are bound by legacy of the semi-borderless tributary system and China’s 
incomplete incorporation into the states system. An historical perspective alone, 
however, perhaps fails to register how this contemporary bout of territorial 
expansion is being employed as part of a nationalist state project within a 
broader Westphalian logic.
While the Chinese state is yet to clarify the intention behind its publication, 
the U-shaped line is perhaps best understood as a discursive redeployment of 
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nationalist historical residue, purposively ambiguous in its intended effect, probing 
of international reactions to maritime expansionism. But – following Duara (1995, 
65) – it may also represent a more profound intention to “transform a society 
with multiple representations of political community into a single social totality… 
[through] the hardening of social and cultural boundaries around a particular con-
figuration of self in relation to an Other”. Crucially, “historical and cultural resources 
are mobilized in [such a] transformation” in order to manufacture a sense of a 
linear historical process – the selective resurrection of fragments of a Chinese 
national consciousness formed during the Nationalist Guomindang Government’s 
nation-building efforts (65).
And one could fruitfully source this political project in the peculiarly potent 
ethnic component of nationalist Chinese discourse formed in the late nine-
teenth-century ferment of colonial encroachment, anti-imperialism, and economic 
Figure 1. disputed claims in the south china sea. source: Voice of america (2012).
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stagnation – traces of which are still evident in, for instance, the contemporary 
Chinese use of minzu as a racially infused importation of the word nation (Cooper 
2015). There is much to be said for an argument that plays on the significance of the 
“remembered history” (Zhao 2015) of China’s imperial past updated through the 
socialist lens of recent history, particularly its serial humiliations (Callahan 2015), 
to reclaim China’s place in the world and popular legitimation of the regime at 
home in China (one of the key objectives of the current leadership; Johnson 2015). 
But even this more nuanced approach misses the extent to which in Beijing it 
has been the navy and elements in the Communist party supportive of it that 
have been opportunistically using the disputes to increase their say (and budgets) 
within the regime (Khong 2013). The U-shaped line, then, with its intellectual and 
geographical raw material inextricably rooted in China’s “century of humiliation,” 
forms one element in a revival of han ethno-nationalism as a contemporary state 
hegemonic project (Minzner 2015). We now turn to the particularities of the dis-
pute its resurrection has helped to bring about.
Inside the cauldron
The U-shaped line incorporates three island chains subjected to significant terri-
torial dispute since 2009: the Paracel Islands, Scarborough Shoal, and the Spratly 
Islands.
The Paracels – a group of 130 coral reefs and atolls – lie slightly over 400 km 
from the coast of hainan Island, China’s most southerly province, and have been 
under the effective control of the PRC since their initial occupation by Chinese 
naval forces in the 1974. Sansha, a small dwelling of 1500 inhabitants on Woody 
Island, was upgraded a prefecture-level city by the PRC in 2012 – an administrative 
status normally granted to cities with over 250,000 urban residents – demarcating 
it as a locus of governance for the entirety of the U-shaped line (french 2015). 
This developed in response to a 2012 law ratified by the Vietnamese government 
claiming Vietnamese sovereignty over the Paracels (as well as the Spratlys), which 
failed to enforce effective Vietnamese control over the islands. In January 2016, 
Triton Island was the subject of the second freedom of Navigation Operation 
(fONOP) launched by the U.S. navy (see Subi Reef, below). Perhaps in response, 
eight anti-aircraft missiles were stationed on nearby Woody Island in february 
2016 – the first weaponry to be permanently situated on a disputed SCS island.
Scarborough Shoal, which sits slightly less than 200 km from Philippines’ Subic 
Bay (and thus within its EEZ), was seized by China in 2012. Previously unoccupied, 
it has since been permanently occupied by Chinese naval forces, who have con-
trolled access and policed fishing rights, proving an acute source of grievance for 
the government of the Philippines.
The Spratly Islands are the largest of the disputed island groups, consisting of 
over 750 maritime features. The Spratlys also form the most hotly contested part 
of the SCS, as China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam all occupy and 
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effectively administer multiple islands and features in the group, each controlling a 
military landing strip. Since late 2014, China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) 
has been responsible for a round of artificial island construction, whereby sand 
dredged from ocean floors is pumped onto reefs, transforming low-tide elevations 
into permanent islands. The result is large masses of sand capable of hosting mil-
itary constructions – airstrips, gun turrets, landing pads, communications towers, 
docks, and naval bases. Three prominent maritime features highlight the major 
disagreements over the Spratly islands:
•  Subi Reef: October 2015 witnessed a U.S. destroyer warship conduct a 
freedom of Navigation Operation (fONOP) aimed at negating Chinese sov-
ereignty claims by sailing within 12 nautical miles of the reef. Receiving the 
support of the Pentagon, the State Department, and the White house, the 
advent of fONOPs demonstrates coherence within the major branches of 
the U.S. government responsible for foreign policy around an assertive pol-
icy of containment.
•  Fiery Cross reef is the site of China’s first completed air-landing strip on 
the disputed island chain. China landed a civilian aircraft on the reef on 
2 January 2016, to the consternation of the Vietnamese navy. According to 
the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI), “in its natural state, fiery 
Cross is submerged at high tide, with the exception of two rocks.” however in 
2014, even before land reclamation activities, fiery Cross facilities included 
a garrison housing up to 200 troops. Reclamation work expanded the size 
of the reef from 0.08 km2 in August 2014 to 0.96 km2 in March 2015 (AMTI 
(Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative) 2016a). The third and most recent 
U.S. fONOP was conducted at fiery Cross reef in May 2016.
•  Mischief Reef, north of the Philippines, is the site of another Chinese air-
strip. This project began shortly after Xi Jinping’s September 2015 visit to 
the United States and was completed in early 2016. China claimed Mischief 
Reef in 1994, following the withdrawal of the U.S. Navy from the nearby 
Philippines in 1991. It is also the site of a standoff around the Sierra Madre, 
the rusting hull of a filipino warship run aground on the Second Thomas 
Shoal in 1999 to reinforce Philippine claims in the region (himmelman 2013). 
The vessel remains permanent home to eight troops tasked with monitor-
ing Chinese naval movements and providing a bulwark against territorial 
expansion in the immediate area.
These cases provide only a flavor of recent developments. Since 2014, China’s 
program of artificial island construction in the Spratly Islands and a gradual mil-
itary build-up across the three island chains has become the greatest source of 
tension in the SCS.5 further, island building highlights the persistence of territorial 
concerns of national states into the twenty-first century, as well as and how such 
concerns are, in turn, being remolded by the advancing scientific and industrial 
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capacities of states. Comaroff (2014, 138) links contemporary developments spe-
cifically to the emergence of trading in large volumes of sand:
With the rise of sand trading, the nation-state has entered a dangerously fluid phase. 
With the coastal earthworks that are under way throughout Southeast Asia and the 
Middle East – a series of reclamations so large that they nearly encroach on sovereign 
borders – territory has acquired an unprecedented liquidity. The malleability of sand 
makes it a uniquely volatile substance. Its softness and scalability distinguish it from 
other modes of infrastructure.… In large quantities, it can be engineered into the most 
fundamental of all infrastructures: land itself.
As China is now demonstrating, however, trading in sand is unnecessary when 
the seabed supplies a plentiful supply of materials for dredging. States possess-
ing such resources and technical capacities may bypass potentially tricky supply 
arrangements altogether, providing them with a comparative advantage against 
those – such as Singapore – subject to geopolitically motivated restrictions on 
sand imports by concerned neighbors. As technological capacities exceed legal 
norms, land reclamation, and the political and geopolitical contestations opening 
up around the rapidly developing capacity for states (and cities) to expand their 
territorial boundaries into the oceans are altering the terms upon which sover-
eignty is conceived and practiced.
Reactions
Both the U-shaped line and the sovereignty of islands – especially the artificial 
islands – are now significant areas of dispute. The line has become a subject to 
fierce public challenge from Vietnam, Philippines, and Malaysia, among others. The 
Philippines lodged a case with the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The hague 
in the summer of 2015 challenging Chinese claims to the island chain (includ-
ing the U-shaped line) under UNCLOS. The UN judged itself capable of ruling on 
the issue in October 2015, delivering its verdict in July 2016. Most significantly, 
China’s U-shaped line was ruled incompatible with UNCLOS and thus invalid under 
international law, delegitimizing China’s claim to sovereignty over the sea. More 
broadly, the outcome guaranteed the legal right of the United States to conduct 
marine patrols without fear of encroaching on Chinese sovereignty, despite the 
protestations of the PRC government. The court holds no mechanism of enforce-
ment, and China has long refused to abide by any judgment, apparently making 
de facto settlement the most likely outcome.
The Philippine case against Chinese maritime claims relied upon two injunc-
tions contained within UNCLOS; that maritime features eligible for 200 mile EEZs 
must be (1) permanently above water, and (2) capable of sustaining human life. 
None of the features (claimed by China or others) in the Spratlys were deemed 
to be “islands” by the judgment, which designated the entire chain “rocks.” Such 
maritime features are incompatible with claims of EEZs. Mischief Reef was judged 
to lie within the Philippines’ EEZ despite its continuing occupation by China, and 
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it was also determined that the Chinese navy unlawfully restricted access to the 
Scarborough Shoal, also a rock. Land reclamation activities problematize prece-
dent around how maritime features are treated by permitting the creation of both 
conditions by the nominal sovereigns themselves. But UNCLOS has confirmed the 
invalidity of any territorial claims made under such conditions. Though the tribunal 
was not within its remit to pass judgment directly on questions of sovereignty, 
this appears to implicitly leave China in the unwelcome position of unlawfully 
occupying maritime features in international waters.
The progressive militarization of the SCS is a disquieting outcome of rival 
maritime claims, and it is only likely to accelerate following the UNCLOS ruling. 
The Philippine Supreme Court has ruled to proceed with an Enhanced Defense 
Agreement with the United States in order to station troops in the country for 
the first time since 1991 (Wall Street Journal 2016). The agreement will witness 
the return of U.S. naval ships to Subic Bay in 2016 (25 years after the U.S. base’s 
forcible closure supposedly marked the beginning of the Philippines’ postcolonial 
era). This follows the opening of Vietnam’s Cam Ranh Bay to Japanese maritime 
vessels as of November 2015 and the muted return of U.S. weapons facilities to 
Da Nang Bay. Both states signed a joint strategic partnership in November 2015 
aimed at bolstering political, military, and economic ties. At the same time, mili-
tary budgets have increased across the region: from 2010 to 2014, the Philippines’ 
budget increased by 35%, Vietnam’s by 59.1%, and Malaysia’s by 27.6%, mirroring 
a Chinese rise of over 50% in the same period. A naval arms race is underway with 
the competitive acquisition of warships, submarines, and aircraft carriers the main 
aim of increased budgets (Stashwick 2015). This has not gone unnoticed by global 
financial capital. In June, Japanese asset management house, Nomura launched 
an Asian Arms Race Basket linked to the stock performance of arms producers 
and heavy industrial firms in Japan, China, and elsewhere (Evans-Pritchard 2016).
It is clear that many littoral SCS states now view China as an imperialist actor 
to be balanced against with U.S. assistance. Vietnam provides a case in point. 
Much like China, the modern Vietnamese state has constituted itself upon and 
in opposition to its experience of imperial subjugation – though with two signif-
icant differences. The first is Vietnam’s much more recent traumatic experiences of 
large-scale military land occupation. The second, flowing from this circumstance, 
is a degree of self-confidence and legitimacy assumed by a regime capable of 
humbling both the United States (the world’s most powerful state at the height 
of its imperium) and, shortly afterwards in 1979, repelling a major land invasion 
by the Chinese. The 1986 Doi Moi market reforms went a long way toward repair-
ing U.S.–Vietnamese relations through the courting of foreign direct investment 
(fDI) and a trade relationship, also replicated by Vietnam’s transformation into a 
supplier of China’s nascent export platform. The geopolitical space granted by 
strong economic relations with both the United States and China now permits 
Vietnam’s strong stance on Chinese territorial infractions, informed by a political 
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consciousness which remains ingrained with the precarity of territoriality and the 
threat of China as a regional imperial aggressor.
Despite the hostility of nearly all states in the region to China’s claims, both 
economics and politics are playing a role in assuaging hostilities between rival 
claimants. As a major economic partner of China, the Philippines finds itself in 
an unexpectedly difficult negotiating position following its U.N. tribunal victory, 
having been granted legal possession of features currently under Chinese de facto 
control. Newly installed President Duterte made eager overtures toward nego-
tiations with China over the status of the maritime features, appointing former 
President Ramos as a special envoy to Beijing to do just this. More broadly, how-
ever, the Philippine government has been insistent on the validity of the ruling 
– rejecting a direct request made by the Chinese foreign minister to disregard the 
ruling. for Taiwan, meanwhile, geopolitical reasoning appears to be producing an 
alignment between Beijing and the newly installed Tsai administration (hitherto 
hostile to the PRC government), as UNCLOS stripped Itu Aba/Taiping – the prime 
Taiwanese outpost in the Spratly Islands – of its island status, negating Taiwanese 
and Chinese claims to its EEZ.
Contrasting theoretical lenses
how best to interpret this tense and complex situation? Most commentary on 
China’s contemporary place in the world, particularly its seeming increased impor-
tance from economic and military perspectives, tends to reproduce mainstream 
Western views, either realist or liberal. Given that many Chinese scholars of for-
eign policy tend to reproduce the positions they learned at graduate school in 
the United States, it is not surprising that they proffer views and predictions that 
parallel those on the “other side” (Agnew 2010).
Conventional American and European narratives portray China as either, in 
realist terms, an emerging Great Power in potential hegemonic succession to the 
United States because of its burgeoning economy (and the “inevitable” military 
clout this will bring (e.g. friedberg 2011) or, in liberal terms, as the linchpin of a new 
global financial–economic order to which China is now involuntarily bonded (e.g. 
hung 2009). The first perspective portrays Chinese foreign policy as necessarily 
requiring an offensive response from a “stabilizing” United States, as recounted in 
a critical vein by Kirshner (2012). Similarly, Luttwak (2012) offers a psychoanalysis 
of state managers’ “great-power autism,” suggesting that their historical acclima-
tization to Chinese “solitary great power presence” in Asia (the past century and 
one-half notwithstanding) renders China’s leadership incapable of sensitivity to 
its rivals’ strategic constraints. The second, meanwhile, largely ignores territorial 
disputes as vestigial attributes of a dying order or regards them as easily resolvable 
within the confines of, for example, UNCLOS (e.g. Nye 2015).
Though both of these viewpoints are policy-oriented, they point in very dis-
tinctive directions for U.S. policy in East Asia. Their common obsession with U.S. 
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policy, however, reveals them as part of an overall “Sino-Americana” debate about 
U.S. policy (Anderson 2012) rather than as having connections to Sinology proper. 
Their premier theme, as Perry Anderson puts it, is: “China – what’s in it for us?,” 
not how best to understand the institutional sources and direction of Chinese 
foreign policy.
Classical geopolitical analysis, such as that of Kaplan (2012), acknowledges the 
historical basis to those disputes in colonial era claims now being challenged by a 
newly motivated and nationalist China. The focus is on how the physical geography 
of the region lends itself to competition for the potential natural resources that the 
ocean represents, with major population concentrations on all sides facing off in 
a zero-sum game. Of course, it is exactly the fungible character of the ocean that 
makes for a greater likelihood of compromises between competing parties (fravel 
2005). Kaplan himself acknowledges that conflict like this in the maritime sphere 
debars the possibility of it triggering a repetition of 1914 in Europe (Kaplan 2014). 
That this historical analogy does lurk ominously in the background of classical 
geopolitical analysis suggests how timeworn it has become.
Outside the academy
Such binary perspectives are also evident in government and policy-making circles, 
and on both sides of the Pacific. While the White house under Obama’s adminis-
tration has restrained the Pentagon and belligerent branches of the state in favor 
of a gradual imperial drawdown, more recently, prominent policy-makers and 
think tanks have begun to argue for a more aggressive U.S. engagement of China 
(McGregor 2015). The intensification of the Pentagon’s SCS operations – alongside 
the three aforementioned fONOPs and two U.S. B52 bomber flyovers of disputed 
islands since October 2015 – is dovetailing with a proliferation of voices favoring 
military deepening in the SCS.
for instance, a major report published by the Council on foreign Relations in 
April 2015 argued for a transition from the liberal policy of facilitating China’s rise 
in the hope of encouraging its peaceful incorporation into the international order 
toward pursuit of an aggressive strategy of containment and intensified military 
engagements, particularly in the SCS (Blackwill and Tellis 2015). This injunction was 
repeated more recently in a major Department of Defense commissioned report, 
Asia-Pacific Rebalance 2025, which is evidently aimed at containing a perceived risk 
from a militarily “capable and more risk-tolerant China,” arguing for the executive 
branch to redouble its efforts in pivoting toward the region and constructing a 
clear strategy for containment. It recommended the United States take a
Predictable, credible, and robust forward presence capable of shaping the peacetime 
security environment and prevailing in the event of conflict. We recommend continu-
ing to implement and resource key posture initiatives; increasing surface fleet presence; 
improving undersea capacity; deploying within the theater additional amphibious lift to 
allow enhanced theater-wide engagement and crisis response; continuing to diversify 
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air operating locations; bolstering regional missile defenses; advancing and adapting 
the U.S. Army’s Regionally Aligned forces concept; addressing logistical challenges; 
stockpiling critical precision munitions; and enhancing intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance cooperation with allies within the region. (CSIS (Center for Strategic and 
International Studies) 2016, ix)
More broadly, the Institute for China–America Studies (ICAS) provides a fort-
nightly bulletin cataloging the findings of policy-making reports on grand strategy 
toward China, which demonstrates a balance in favor of those making the case 
for intensifying U.S. strategy toward China in the guise of containment, defensive 
engagement, or low-level coercion, variously. Such policy prescriptions are fur-
thered through think tanks’ savvy provision of Internet-based tracking systems of 
Chinese artificial island building. The web now pulsates with eye-catching info-
graphics that thrust the browser into the worldview of an anxious U.S. military 
strategist tasked with observing detailed satellite images of construction activi-
ties on, and the movements of warships around, the three island chains (see, for 
instance, the Asia Maritime Transparency Institute’s “Island Tracker” and the Center 
for a New American Security’s “fLAShPOINTS” series of maps; AMTI (Asia Maritime 
Transparency Initiative) 2016b; CNAS (Center for a New American Security) 2016).
A similar cycle is evident in Chinese policy circles. Several commentators have 
interpreted from recent pronouncements that China is rebalancing from its aggres-
sive stance toward cooperation with its littoral neighbors – including a resumption 
of long-delayed negotiations with ASEAN on developing a code of conduct for 
the SCS (Shirk 2014). China’s commitment to the code was firmly reiterated in the 
aftermath of the UN ruling. In October of 2015, Li Keqiang, China’s Prime Minister 
identified as liberal counterweight to Xi Jinping’s authoritarianism, outlined a 
five-point plan for peace in the SCS (Economist 2015). The following November, 
Xi himself met with Ma Ying-Jeuo, then-president of Taiwan, and Beijing’s lenient 
response to his visit to the contested Itu Aba Island suggested a definite tempering 
of regional assertiveness (Economist 2016b). China’s immediate response to the 12 
July ruling was to firmly clamp down on nationalist protests rejecting the outcome, 
to reiterate its support for a Code of Conduct with ASEAN, and – apparently – to 
seek to open bilateral negotiations with rival claimants.
In contrast to such geniality, however, China’s official defense strategy has 
switched to that of “active defense” since the summer of 2015, and it is ostensibly 
aimed toward securing the entirety of the “Maritime Silk Road” – a trading route 
stretching from the SCS to the eastern coasts of Africa and southern Europe (Gady 
2015). Moreover, realist think tanks have been established in several universities 
across China with the apparent aim of exploring legal bases to maritime claims 
(Tiezzi 2014). The purchase of such geostrategic thinking on the PLA Navy was 
evident by the announcement in late July that China and Russia would hold joint 
naval drills in the SCS as early as September – presumably coinciding with the con-
clusion of the G20 summit in hangzhou. The liberal/realist dualism is reproduced, 
then, in China as much as in the West.
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Sovereignty regimes in the SCS
Such policy differentiations exist simply because China itself is not a single uni-
tary actor. Within China, today different political factions and institutions vie for 
influence over foreign policy. As Beeson and Li (2015, 94) state, “There is no clear, 
unified consensus … among scholars and policy makers in China itself.” China 
is caught between the two distinctive political–economic impulses that liberal 
and realist positions isolate and reify: the impulse to realize territorial claims and 
its national “integrity,” on the one hand, and the demands of a globalized econ-
omy upon which its export-based economic growth has largely depended, on 
the other. If the former is visible in the claims and counter-claims about Taiwan 
(e.g. Pan 2010), as well as in the maritime disputes, the latter is at the center of the 
conundrum over how to manage current economic volatility: whether through 
liberalizing the economy and sacrificing party control, or reinforcing state con-
trol and probably restricting China’s role in international institutions and foreign 
economic development (e.g. Beeson and Li 2015). The politics of the regime will 
determine the outcome of these tensions, not some a priori set of determinants 
that can be identified to predict the future.
Analyzing the politics of both regimes is the objective of this concluding sec-
tion. As we have noted, the kind of game theoretical account of the SCS standoff 
proffered by institutions like the ICAS methodologically excludes consideration 
of the qualitatively different state-society complexes at odds in the SCS, and how 
this might shape the nature of geopolitical competition. As Rosenberg (1994, 30) 
puts it, the problem of realist analysis is how it “poses the state as a completed 
social order such that its foreign interests are constituted entirely internationally 
– thereby removing interpretation of the ‘national interest’ from domestic political 
contestation.”
We thus begin from the injunction that geographical and geopolitical “facts” are 
never pre-given. They are themselves products of dynamic social sources; capital 
accumulation, class struggle, modalities of governance, political strategies, and 
their discursive mediations all shape the quantity, quality, and political economic 
significance of natural, industrial, and military assets. This is not to endorse the 
social constructivist trend in IR theory that anarchy is “what states make of it” 
(Wendt 1992). for instance, a decade ago high oil prices made the Middle East 
central to global geopolitical concerns – control over which was viewed as critical 
by the Pentagon and the Bush administration. A relaxation of U.S. imperial policy 
in the Middle East will likely now accompany the U.S.’ shale revolution and the 
subsequent collapse of global oil prices. While such physical assets, then, do indeed 
furnish the material substratum of geopolitical agency, there is no straight line 
from their existence to the particular strategies of particular states.
Agnew (2009) distinguishes between four ideal types of sovereignty regimes 
(classic, globalist, integrative, and imperialist) in order to highlight how accumu-
lation systems have tended to cohere into distinctive permutations of territorial 
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control and political authority.6 In order to trace how geopolitical “facts” are made 
geopolitically salient in the case of the SCS, we follow Agnew’s (2009) ideal typol-
ogy of sovereignty regimes and assign the United States-and China-stylized forms 
of practicing state sovereignty. The period of neoliberal globalization provided a 
golden opportunity to facilitate the insertion of China’s state-controlled economy 
into the world market. The aim was preservation of Communist Party rule in the 
context of political upheaval in the Soviet bloc, and the effect was the creation of 
a class of cadre-capitalists reliant upon a politicized form of export-led capitalism 
in which boundaries between state and market became blurred. Though China’s 
modality of accumulation was inflected by the high degree of exports and fDI 
came to represent as shares of GDP, its state remained relatively centralized and 
strong, and its overt political administration of territory remained high (during a 
period of deregulation and depoliticization in the advanced capitalist economies).
China may be categorized as a relatively clear case of Westphalian sovereignty 
in which “despotic and infrastructural power [are] still largely deployed within a 
bounded state territory” (2009, 130).7 This is reflected by China’s race into the sphere 
of IR during the past decade, which has frequently witnessed it circumventing mul-
tilateral organizations – opting instead to establish a web of bilateral relations with 
the governments of other states predicated upon a principle of non-interference. 
This bilateralism, according to Gonzalez-Vicente (2015, 213), “empowers the cen-
tral governments of China’s counterparts, subsequently reinvigorating the role of 
central state elites as regulators of regional economic governance.”
The United States, by contrast, has performed the role of global hegemon since 
1945. following British free-trade imperialism, its borders have more often than 
not remained open to flows of goods, services, and persons, while its economy has 
become increasingly dominated by financial services and intermediation following 
the erosion of manufacturing competitiveness. The U.S. system of managing the 
global political economy has also largely relied upon non-territorial imperialism 
rather than formal colonialism – though its rule has also been punctuated by an 
impulse “toward a scattered imperium (as in Iraq)” (Agnew 2009, 132). It may thus 
be characterized as a globalist sovereignty regime, concerned equally with man-
aging the world system as with its own domestic issues, or at least constructing 
an alignment between the two.
While the U.S.’ globalist sovereignty regime is broadly characterized by the pur-
suit of non-territorial imperialism and a de-colonial foreign policy, China’s classic 
regime may be anticipated to be more territorially expansionist in its aims. China’s 
concern to claim maritime territory must be situated within a state-society com-
plex in which political stability and state directed catch-up development remain 
overarching strategic aims of state policy. This makes China’s territorial periphery, 
as President Xi has put it, “strategically extremely important to our country in terms 
of geography, natural environment and mutual relations” (cited in Jakobson and 
Medcalf 2015, 10). Xi thus insists that “islands in the SCS have been China’s terri-
tory since ancient times, and the Chinese government must take responsibility 
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to safeguard its territorial sovereignty and legitimate maritime interests” (cited 
in Wong 2015). Meanwhile, the United States, in its function as global hegemon, 
attempts to align the interests of other states with its own in order to uphold a 
positive sum liberal global order. Its overarching global aim, then, is to uphold 
international maritime law and freedom of navigation rights for all states, a man-
date which transcends its own narrow interests.
Sovereignty regimes and their physiognomies, however, exist “in a global 
relational space rather than in the absolute territorial space with which they are 
symbolically associated” (Agnew 2009; 144). Taking the example of China’s territo-
rialized currency regime, Agnew (2009, 157–158) spells out how China’s entry into 
the world economy has exerted pressure toward liberalization of its exchange rate 
regime – directly from the U.S. government, but also from economic imbalances 
generated by excess investment in manufacturing. The renminbi has been on a 
path of gradual liberalization since the mid-2000s, with a significant relaxation 
its management announced in August 2015. In the United States, similarly, the 
flotation of the dollar has been a source of great domestic political strife as its 
increased value has led to the erosion of manufacturing competitiveness, even 
while also facilitating the dollar’s function as the dominant global currency. The 
outcome of these disputes has been negotiated attempts to avoid competitive 
currency devaluations against the dollar by other states, most notably in the Plaza 
Accord of 1985, as well as rancorous disagreements with the Chinese government 
over the renminbi’s dollar peg during the 2000s.
The SCS is one absolute space in which the Chinese and U.S. sovereignty regimes 
co-exist in relation to each other. As we have seen – and in apparent contradiction 
with the liberal inclinations of a globalist regime of sovereignty – the overall trend 
within the United States has been toward greater assertiveness toward China, with 
targeted fONOPS, fly-bys, and intelligence gathering – reminiscent of the classical 
Westphalian practice of sovereignty and geopolitical containment rather than 
the U.S.’ putative policy of “counterbalancing” China. Etzioni (2016, 508) regards 
fONOPs, in particular, as dangerous and flagrant instances of power projection 
in the Asia-Pacific, leveling the accusation that “the United States acts as judge, 
jury, and executioner” in such disputes over freedom of navigation. Conversely, 
alongside a Chinese trend toward territorial expansionism, we have also noted 
embryonic conciliatory and cooperative discourses, which encourage compromise 
and even retreat on disputes in the SCS. The deeper the strategic engagement 
becomes, the more likely one practice of sovereignty or the other is to dominate 
both sides (however, it seems unlikely that the Chinese cooperative discourse 
would win out in the face of ever greater U.S. encroachment). As opposing sov-
ereignty regimes coexist and interact, their modalities of governance cannot be 
modified by the experience of exogenous forces exerted by the other.
Beyond mutually conditioning interactivity between sovereignty regimes (hith-
erto treated as self-contained units of analysis), it is also productive to disaggre-
gate state sovereignty, by exploring how institutions within the states involved 
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demonstrate contradictory tendencies and linkages to civil society actors that go 
beyond purely national boundaries. To this extent, hameiri and Jones (2016) make 
an interesting case for China’s SCS policy as an outcome of the fragmentation of 
the Chinese state under the pressures of neoliberal globalization. here, “multiple 
state and quasi-private agencies, having become somewhat autonomous foreign 
policy actors, are pursuing uncoordinated and sometimes contradictory agendas 
overseas” (2016, 85). Their account of China’s expansionary policy attempts to dis-
aggregate ‘the state’ as the unitary actor of IR theory by foregrounding the very 
different roles and material interests of particular (state and non-state) actors: 
China’s national oil and petroleum companies intent on protecting extractive rights 
for hydrocarbons; the PLA navy and its goal of securing budgetary allocations by 
manufacturing maritime disputes; and hainan’s provincial government, incentiv-
ized to secure fishing and extractive rights against its regional competitors. They 
also make much of the divisions between the Chinese Ministry of foreign Affairs 
(MfA) and more belligerent state institutions, emphasizing the MfA’s powerless-
ness in the face of policy dictation by the armed forces and party apparatuses, 
as well as avant-garde actions by local SCS interests (2016, 86–89). Their account 
provides a valuable insight into the micro-foundations shaping the motivations 
of actors at the vanguard of SCS expansion and challenges any simple ascription 
of a coherent grand strategy to Chinese policy in the SCS.
Perhaps as a consequence of the intellectual fragmentation of realism’s once-
mighty grip on IR theory (Agnew 2015), it is no longer only critical theorists who 
have taken up the significance of disaggregating state institutions and exploring 
national social bases of international politics. Both Shirk (2014) and friedberg 
(2014) – writing, respectively, from liberal and realist perspectives – have consid-
ered the significance of domestic politics in determining China’s foreign policy 
imperatives in the SCS, providing dissections of the Chinese state into its con-
stituent parts. Shirk (2014) notes the “stovepiping” of bureaucratic institutions 
(in which vertical command structures inside ministries debar communications 
between them) as a major source of incoherence in SCS policy and friedberg (2014, 
138–140) pays due attention to the role of vested nationalist interests and the 
PLA navy in fomenting the dispute.8 But such analysis, even as it is delivered from 
prominent academics of left and right deeply embedded in policy networks, seems 
to have done little to dissipate the militarization of the dispute on the U.S. side.
Despite the merits of such particularistic interpretations, however, events since 
2015 appear to have overtaken their analytical cogency. Although the MfA does 
appear to have held a delimiting role earlier in the dispute, it is now a vocal oppo-
nent of what it sees as U.S. infractions in the SCS. for instance, on 30 January 2016, 
the Ministry of foreign Affairs strongly criticized the USS Curtis Wilber for conduct-
ing a fONOP “in Chinese territorial waters” (Panda 2016). Such bellicosity (now 
commonly voiced by an increasingly bellicose MfA) contrasts with the timidity of 
earlier statements highlighted by hameiri and Jones.
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Of note too is the rapidity with which Xi Jinping has effectively centralized 
political authority in myriad ways; for instance, his self-installation as head of the 
leading group on Military Reform, his subordination of previously powerful mil-
itary institutions to the party-chaired Central Military Commission (of which Xi 
himself is leader), and his assumption of the leadership of the National Security 
Commission since January 2014. To the extent that Xi has successfully central-
ized command over policy direction, a reading of the dispute which privileges 
the particular interests and agency of – for instance – the hainan provincial gov-
ernment in securing fish stocks for its resident trawlers (whatever its particular 
role in originating the dispute) no longer seems viable. And recent events seem 
to bear witness to a centralized SCS policy. following Xi’s much heralded reform 
of the PLA in early 2016, the army command structure was reduced from seven 
to five “theater commands.” Admiral Wang Jiaocheng, head of the new Southern 
Command responsible for deployments in the SCS, warned that the Chinese “mili-
tary will be capable of dealing with any security threat. No country will be allowed 
to use any excuse or action to threaten China’s sovereignty and safety” (Zhou 
2016). Responses from the military to the Presidency were unanimous in equally 
vociferous condemnation of the July UN ruling.
This suggests that short-circuiting the realist policy “feedback loop of power 
competition” may not be as simple as a matter of improving actors’ reflexive inter-
pretations of their situatedness, as many of those writing from a constructivist 
perspective in IR would have it (cf. Barkin 2010, 90). There exist material pressures, 
rooted in uneven economic development, political multiplicity, and the various 
modalities of practicing sovereignty, which encourage states to engage in mutually 
disciplinary forms of competitive behavior. The system of national states forms an 
“interactive multiplicity of societies” (Rosenberg 2013, 583), the effects of which 
“confront capitalists and state managers as ‘external’ forces,” compelling particular 
forms of interpretation and suggesting particular courses of action (Rolf 2015, 
118). These forces are balanced against an expanding and ever more integrated 
global economy that transcends any supposedly “sovereign” state territories and 
discourages moves that threaten the stability of markets. Neither side of this dia-
lectic can be decisive while the capitalist world economy continues to reproduce a 
system of national states, but in the case of the SCS, it certainly appears as though 
an ineluctable logic of geopolitical competition is taking hold.
Conclusion
China’s destabilizing reach into the SCS occurs at the same time as it plays a glo-
balizing, “responsible great power” role in international organizations and claims 
an ever-greater stake in the U.S.-led system of global capitalism. Meanwhile, the 
United States increasingly behaves according to the logic of realpolitik, building a 
regional alliance in what increasingly appears as an attempt to contain China’s rise. 
Realism is becoming more deeply embedded in the outlook of state managers, 
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who seek to defend territorialized interests – threatening to undermine the glo-
balist open-door strategy with exclusionary military and economic practices. U.S. 
hegemony has suffered the effects of defeat in Iraq and Afghanistan, revolutionary 
and reactionary turbulence across the MENA region, and Russian territorial expan-
sionism – apparently distracting from Obama’s much-vaunted pivot to East Asia 
in the face of intensified diplomacy elsewhere.
In writings from the West, there currently exists strong pressure to criticize 
China’s flagrant disregard for the UN’s ruling. however, there are reasons for critical 
theorists to remain highly skeptical of the capacity of international law to resolve 
the dispute in this instance. In a widely circulated recent piece, Graham Allinson 
(2016) notes that large states have rarely agreed to the terms of a dispute settled 
by UNCLOS. Indeed, the United States is not even itself a signatory to the con-
vention. International law, in this case, is a vestige of uni-polarity not designed to 
accommodate the expansive territorial claims of rising powers, and its rhetorical 
deployment is plainly open to politicization by Western states. This is not to suggest 
that China has acted justly – but that the current legal framework is manifestly not 
up to the task of adjudicating in this dispute. On the other side of the debate, those 
few Western writers such as Nolan (2013) who side with China from a position of 
anti-imperialism overlook the extent to which China is fast becoming a capable 
and assertive regional imperial agent in its own right: what else could explain the 
flight of Vietnam, for instance, into allegiance with the United States? The tensions 
threatening to bubble over in the SCS may be defused neither by so directly taking 
sides nor through blind faith in legal precedent established in a bygone age of 
American uni-polarity.
In this piece, we have attempted to sketch the outlines of how a materialist con-
ception of foreign policy predicated on contrasting sovereignty regimes might be 
applied to the SCS. Policy and commentary differences on both sides are, at root, 
symptoms of a material contradiction between the benefits and risks of economic 
interdependence and territorial expansionism. These are founded upon a real-
world contradiction and will be resolved politically. In the SCS, an intensification 
of interstate rivalry is fast becoming the outcome of a period of unprecedented 
economic interconnectedness. Those wishing to avoid conflict should widen the 
scope of their analysis to begin to account for why globalization may not always 
be the pacifying force its proponents would have us believe.
Notes
1.  Or, when such theorists do attempt to contextualize disputes, this is performed 
inductively. Luttwak (2012) and friedberg (2011) construct realist grand narratives of 
Sino-US relations on the basis of game theoretical models of military interactions.
2.  At the time of publication, the TPP has been cast into fresh doubt following its firm 
disavowal by both the Democratic and Republican presidential nominees. This does 
not preclude its passage under the Obama administration’s final months in office. In 
either event, the potential collapse of the TPP would not corroborate a renewal of U.S. 
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globalism but rather its obverse – a retreat into U.S. isolationism as a strategic response 
to the “China threat,” among myriad imperial dilemmas.
3.  The conflict has led to a major break in Japanese postwar pacifism as the Abe 
Government has sought to remilitarize in light of a rising China. One response was 
China’s unprecedented unilateral imposition of an Air Defense Identification Zone in 
September 2013.
4.  Repeated and fairly minor skirmishes between coast guards and fishing vessels 
from both nations have occasionally led to deaths as small trawlers are subjected to 
ramming by other boats. More serious are the rival military exercises undertaken by 
China and Russia on one side, and the United States and South Korea on the other, 
contesting the Ieodo–Suyan reef.
5.  It should be noted that Vietnam, Malaysia, Taiwan, and the Philippines have all engaged 
in land reclamation activities, though China’s effort dwarfs that of its neighboring 
states. Its activities account for 95% of total acreage reclaimed since 2012 (Erickson 
and Bond 2015).
6.  The classic and globalist regimes are discussed below in the cases of China and the 
United States. The imperialist regime, meanwhile, is characteristic of many states across 
the Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America, where “central state authority 
is seriously in question because of external dependence and manipulation as well 
as corruption and chronic mismanagement…. Infrastructural power is weak or non-
existent and despotic power is often effectively in outside hands.” (Agnew 2009, 130–
131)The integrative regime is best represented by the European Union, in which “many 
of the founding states of the Westphalian system have thrown in their lot with one 
another to create a larger and, as yet, politically unclassifiable entity that challenges 
existing state sovereignty in functionally complex and often times non-territorial ways” 
(2009, 130–131).
7.  China is not, however, simply just another “state” in the “state-is-a-state-is-a-state” 
catechism of much thinking about foreign policy-making (even as such thinking often 
and contradictorily assumes an exceptional America). China is much more than a 
distant heir to a now universal but originally European political form – the nation state 
(Wang 2014). Among other things, it has employed a common ideographic script for 
its language (notwithstanding many diverse dialects) for over 3000 years has retained 
more or less the same borders and ethnic variety since 1800, and its history belies the 
neat empire versus nation state binary that is central to contemporary American and 
European thought about political systems.
8.  As a realist, however, friedberg (2014, 140–142) eventually discounts such explanations 
as supportive but insufficient guides to Chinese strategy, insisting on the analytical 
primacy of the international dimension.
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